



TIG Brief



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From the Inspector General



Every day I get to see how intensely the people in our Air Force work to defend our country. Despite a mission set that at times seems overwhelming, it's the amazing professionals in our Air Force that make success possible. One of those Airmen, a member of our inspection enterprise team, recently achieved recognition for her outstanding contributions.



Ms. Barb Johnston, an inspector at the AF Inspection Agency, won the civilian category for the Air Force Association's General Larry D. Welch Award. This recognizes the most significant impact by an individual on the overall operations safety, security, and effectiveness of the Air Force nuclear enterprise. What an honor! We celebrated with her at the AFA convention when she received the award in person from our senior AF leaders.

While this prestigious honor for Ms. Johnston is well deserved, it would not have occurred had her immediate supervision not done the work to nominate and tell her story. They went the extra mile in taking the time out of their busy schedule to put pen to paper and recognize an individual's steadfast exceptional performance. Admittedly, writing these award packages is not easy, but it is an essential part of our Airmen's development--and morale. Such recognition efforts are a critical element of command as outlined in AFI 1-2, *Commander's Responsibilities*, to "promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the persons under their command or charge." Additionally, all of us can take pride in the recognition of a fellow Airman making a positive difference in our mission. This is what sets us apart from other organizations: our ability to make the mission and people aspects of our AF a team endeavor. Let us bask in the success of our teammates and learn from those who blazed the trails before us.

As such, we should seek to learn from the successes of our Airmen and take the counsel of those who impart their lessons learned. For example, this edition of TIG Brief has the Deputy AETC IG, Mr. Ken Frollini, detail his experiences encountered during a UEI and how this positively influenced his own quality of life and may help yours as well! His is a story of continually seeking to improve and being willing to learn in any endeavor.

As we head into autumn and a new fiscal year, take time to reflect and then build upon the great things you, your co-workers, and supervisors have done to make things better for our Air Force. General Robin Rand said it best as he reflected upon his retirement after 44 years of service to our country: "If I could do it over again, I would; I would just do it better."

All the best,

Lt Gen Stayce D. Harris
Air Force Inspector General

Enlisted Chat




Greetings again Inspector General (IG) Enterprise teammates! Thank you all for what you do for our Air Force by pursuing issues that improve our mission and the quality of life for our Airmen. As the summer wanes, I encourage you to schedule some downtime, if you have not had an opportunity to recharge, from the hectic work pace.

For this Enlisted Chat, I would like to provide an update on the Manpower Study and sharing information on our new process for deploying IG personnel. Our ongoing manpower study is on track for a 1 Oct 18 completion. We received our Standard Working Document (SWD) and Lt Gen Harris has approved its contents. So, what is a SWD and what is its purpose? The SWD outlines codified mission requirements for Inspection and Complaints Resolution Work Centers and breaks down each process to develop

standard operating procedures. Each process has a unique identifier assigned and consists of a process number, required input and output, source of count, governing directives, and total process time. Each process is then broken into (1) Process Start, (2) Activities, (3) Decision Points, and (4) Process Stop using flowcharts. After completing the flowcharts, the attending subject matter experts (SMEs) completed a narrative for each activity. The narrative includes Standard Activity Times (SAT) for each activity listed in the flowchart.

For example, SMEs participating in the study developed Process 1.2.4. for Wounded, Injured, and Ill Housing Inspections as depicted in Figure 1 below (More information on the



SWD is located on SharePoint: https://cs2.eis.af.mil/sites/10519/IG_SEL/layouts/15/start.aspx#/SitePages/Home.aspx.)

Figure 1. Process: 1.2.4. Performs Wounded, Injured, and Ill (WII) Housing Inspection.




Table 9. Process 1.2.4. Performs Wounded, Injured, and Ill (WII) Housing Inspection.

Step	Activity	Activity Description	SAT
1.2.4.01.	Contacts RSM	Reviews monthly roster; contacts RSM; and determines inspection requirement.	27
1.2.4.01D.	Housing Inspection?	If a housing inspection is required, go to 1.2.4.02.; if a housing inspection is not required, go to 1.2.4.03. NOTE: The decision is made and time is consumed in the previous activity. The decision activity just directs entity traffic to the correct route (not a measurable task).	
1.2.4.02.	Conducts Inspection	Obtains and reviews unit inspection report; notifies housing office, unit leadership, medical clinic POC, and Recovery Care Coordinator of inspection date; travels to RSM; conducts inspection; and travels back to work center.	170
1.2.4.03.	Completes Report	Logs into IGEMS; drafts report; updates database; finalizes report in IGEMS; logs out of IGEMS; sends report to housing office, unit leadership, medical clinic POC, and Higher Headquarters (HHQ); and conducts follow-up interview with RSM.	139
	WII Housing Inspection Completed		

Once started, the first activity in this process is 1.2.4.01., Contacts Recovering Service Member (RSM). A decision point follows this: “Housing Inspection?” If the answer is “Yes,” the process will go to 1.2.4.02., Conducts Inspection. If the answer is “No,” the process continues to activity 1.2.4.03., Completes Report. The process ends once activity 1.2.4.03. is completed (Table 9), Process 1.2.4. Performs Wounded, Injured, and Ill (WII) Housing Inspection, (immediately below the flowchart) is the descriptive narrative for each activity box and decision point shown above. In addition, the SAT associated with each activity box is in the far right column of Table 9. Once the manpower study is complete, I will upload our workload factor results and the equation to determine the number of IG personnel for your organization.

Now, let’s discuss deploying Inspector General Personnel. Before diving into the new process, let me share some background. During the past few years, the Air Force has been deploying personnel to fill IG roles downrange. Because IG is a special duty identifier without a Unit Type Code, personnel deployed held various core AFSCs. Essentially, anyone could deploy as an IG as long as the person filling the position met the requirements and received “just-in-time” IG training prior to deploying. Let me be clear, we appreciate these members stepping-up (volunteer or voluntold) to meet the requirements and provide support to our Airmen downrange. However, we quickly realized that our process for selecting personnel was not fair to the deploying member or the team(s) they were supporting downrange. It is not easy to fulfill IG roles and responsibilities and to do so requires time and experience. We knew we had to improve our process due to sending inexperienced personnel to fill IG billets.

Fast forward to now. In collaboration with Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center (AEF Center), we have been beta testing ways to select trained and experienced IG personnel to fill deployment roles. We sent out calls through each MAJCOM for volunteers to fill deployments. Volunteers have to be medically eligible to deploy and fill out an “outside band” volunteer form if the deployment time frame is not within their normal tempo band or fill out an “inside band” volunteer form to let their leadership know they are volunteering to deploy.

With the success of the first beta test, we will continue to expand the program. We are building a database of all IG trained personnel, their tempo bands, and deployment eligibility. We will use the database to target trained personnel and email to seek volunteers for deployment. If we do not receive volunteers, then we will task personnel based on eligibility criteria. Additionally, we have received approval to allow civilians to volunteer for deployments. If a civilian wants to volunteer, they must have completed Air Force IG training, meet all deployment eligibility requirements, receive approval from their leadership, and contact my office for coordination with the United States Air Forces Central Command and AEF Center.

Overall, we feel the deployment processes we are beta testing are successful and produce a win-win situation for the IG Enterprise. Our goal is to provide the best trained and experienced IG personnel to support our warfighters downrange, and this process brings us closer to achieving that goal. Whew, as you can see, we have many happenings occurring in our IG community! All of these happenings are results of your actions and voices letting us know your desires for improving the force.

Please keep the great ideas flowing and ask more of us! We all improve by challenging the status quo and thinking outside the box.

Once again, thank you for what you do for the Airmen and our Air Force!



Enterprise Trends



-Succinct Updates on Enterprise Level Observed Strengths, Challenges and Opportunities-

The Secretary and Chief identified Innovation as one of five Air Force Priorities. Supporting the Priority for Innovation, TIG's Strategic Objective of 'Providing Actionable Cross-Tell to External Stakeholders' obliges us to ask, "How Can We Do Better?"

Enterprise Trends is a succinct update on enterprise activities that can help "ensure our Airmen are properly organized, trained, and equipped to fight and win" (*Squadron Revitalization Implementation Plan*). We encourage your inputs so that we can continue to improve (TIGBrief@us.af.mil)!

Inspections and Commander's Inspection Program Observations:

- Aged Deficiencies-There are 148 aged IGEMS deficiencies. Please assess your aged deficiencies and close or transfer them to Wing, MAJCOM or SAF Corporate process.
- Unit Effectiveness Inspection (UEI) Strengths
 - In the last three months, there were 500+ strengths input to IGEMS. The Wing IGEMS Manager has privileges to extract the details (AFIA can provide details upon request).
 - 47 FTW/MDG developed a "Survival Guide for Medics". This booklet has clinical practice guidelines, preventive recommendations, and local medical phone numbers.
 - 141 ARW/IG Self-Assessment Business Rules outline CCIP requirements and effectively provides Commanders with guidelines and tools to establish a CCIP.
 - 70 ISRW/IG created a risk-based sampling strategy (RBSS) tool for analyzing non-compliance. It incorporates SME-quantified impact and wing commander priorities.

Capability updates:

- Next Generation Information System-The replacement for TIGIRS continues to progress. This system will not only replace and integrate legacy capabilities, but will add other capabilities needed to support the command chain. The functional (AFIA) and the program office (AFLCMC) initiated a 12-month Business Process Mapping (BPM) effort to refine Next Gen requirements; subsequently Next Gen will enter the acquisition cycle.
- REAPER-The Readiness Exercise Advanced Planning, Execution and Reporting training contract was recently awarded. This course will enable wings to better execute exercises that meet scope, scale, rigor, relevance, recurrence and reporting (S2R4) criteria.
- IGEMS Air Force Level Reports-This report function failed in April 18. We continue to trouble shoot; in the meantime, units can pull the IGEMS data using the MAJCOM report function. AFIA can provide MAJCOM report function training as required.
- Mobile Training Teams (MTT)-AFIA continues to execute MTTs upon request. In FY18 AFIA will conduct five IG Training Course MTT's and six Exercise MTTs.

Strategic Updates:

- Squadron Revitalization Implementation Plan (I-Plan)-Signed out in Jun 18, the document provides a clear action plan to achieve the goals established in CSAF Focus Area #1.
- SAF/IG Worldwide Training Conference-The dates have been confirmed for 6-10 May 2019 at the National Conference Center. More details in December 2018.
- AFI 90-201-The new AFI will incorporate changes from Wings and MAJCOMs as approved through the Executive Steering Group.

Airmen Readiness & Running--It's Not Simple

For years as an Air Force Officer, I struggled to find motivation when it came to running. I understood its inherent health benefits; however, the combination of sore leg muscles, aching shin splints, and the effort it took me to run any farther than 1.5 miles was a discouragement.

During AETC's recent Unit Effectiveness Inspection of the 37th Training Wing (TRW) at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, I discovered the real reason I did not enjoy running. I had been doing it wrong my entire life! My discovery came thanks to the 323rd Training Squadron (TRS), a Basic Military Training Squadron, which is engaged in a little known initiative affectionately known as VIPER (Versatile Injury Prevention and EMBEDDED Reconditioning). VIPER focuses on the conundrum of running injuries and the prevention and recovery from them.



VIPER's goal is to prevent injuries that result in lost training days by embedding sports medicine in the training environment. The initiative started in January 2016, and Phase 1 ended in July 2018. Compared to other training squadrons, the 323 TRS had 25 percent fewer musculoskeletal injuries and 37 percent fewer injury-related healthcare visits. Bottom line: 40 percent reduction in missed training time and \$1.1 million cost avoidance for medical care.

Through VIPER, the 37 TRW is collaborating with local 59th Medical Wing providers and sports medicine athletic trainers from the University of the Incarnate Word. Together, they are using



state-of-the-art technology that allows them to "map" how a person runs. VIPER uses a special treadmill that measures ground reaction force of heel and toe strike pressures. Researchers combine this data with a video analysis of a runner's gait, which pinpoints the center of gravity, leg positioning, muscle usage, and runner's cadence. This information allows the VIPER Team to identify problems that may result from an individual's running technique and helps the VIPER Team provide training to reduce these problems.

During the inspection, I learned the effective use of hamstrings and gluteal muscles is key to a runner's performance. When I would run incorrectly, I over extended my legs in an effort to lengthen my stride, which resulted in burning my thigh muscles. Bottom line: I did not know how to run properly and with just a few tips like increasing my cadence to 3 steps-per-second and pushing backward using my gluteal muscles, I increased my speed and was able to run longer. I put these techniques to the test at our fitness center track, and it is making a difference!

Unit effectiveness for the 323 TRS is all about taking young men and women, some of whom may come from a sedentary lifestyle, and turning them into fit combat-capable Airmen. In the Air Force, we spend significant resources on equipment; however, our most valuable resource is our people. Through the efforts of sports medicine experts and clinics like VIPER, the Air Force is ensuring the long-term readiness of our force. So, if you are not a runner by nature or get upset when you have to force yourself to prepare for the 1.5-mile run, perhaps you are not running correctly. Find out from your local military treatment facility if they have a sports medicine doctor or athletic trainer who may be able to help.

Mr. Kenneth "T-Dub" Frollini, Deputy Inspector General, HQ AETC/IG

Five Techniques for Compliance Excellence

A healthy organizational culture negates the need for inspection preparation. Even if your team does not consider itself compliance-based, consider replacing the term compliance with performance. The team is still answering to or complying with a call to action or an objective, and a performance-based culture fuels the team's success. Thus, professionals do not really "prepare" for inspections: instead, they encourage cultures that promote adherence to standards at all times. Mission readiness equals inspection readiness! We should not be wasting time pouring through programs in the days leading up to an inspection; we should continually assess those programs and maintain them at a level appropriate for the mission.



We should strive to elevate our inspection preparation consciousness. Should a commander track performance based on the four Major Graded Areas (MGA)? The leader's responsibility is to manage resources, lead people, improve the unit, and execute the mission--not track MGAs. Have you ever seen a mission or vision statement with "MGA" in it? Of course not. While it is difficult to operate MGA-free, we can be very deliberate in use of the term. When reporting organizational health, speak in terms of defined responsibilities. When discussing inspection results, MGAs are appropriate. Although this may seem like mincing words, this terminology consideration is appropriate to address inspection prep awareness.

Five Techniques for Compliance Excellence

What is compliance excellence? The leaders of the organization ultimately define excellence. Generally, programs can be compliant at rates below 100 percent. Zero defects are excellent, but not if we cannot sustain them for the long term. Therefore, we must tie excellence to a culture that embraces sustained and repeatable compliance processes.

1. Leadership is key. If the boss does not care, then why should you care? Most follow the example set by the leadership. A culture of compliance results from the participation of everyone, starting at the top. Senior leadership must champion this culture and guide and adjust it. Compliance requires attention to detail. Attention to detail requires (1) a desire to do well (caring), and (2) the knowledge of the required level of detail (training). Again, if the boss is not detail-oriented and does not care, a culture of detail or compliance will be difficult to achieve.

2. Know your critical compliance areas. If you are running a donut shop, the batter better be perfect every day. That is critical. What if the batter is perfect, but you lose power to the fryer, and there is no back-up power? That is a risk which may become another critical area. A critical compliance area directly affects key objectives or even safety. Start at the objectives and work backwards to identify areas that have the highest impact to the organization. Areas of high risk to an operation are critical; however, probability, impact, or severity of those risks must temper risk mitigation strategies.

3. Identify and predict non-compliance. We need to identify non-compliance in a timely manner because we want to maintain healthy programs that others can rely upon. We must assume an active compliance posture. Achieving a state of compliance and then walking away to wait for a defect is passive compliance. This might be appropriate for low impact defects, like running out of printer paper

in the office environment. Do you know where your non-compliance lives? Zero knowledge of an applicable regulation results in a compliance black-hole effect--the most dangerous scenario (Klingler, 2016) making it impossible to find non-compliance, no matter how many self-assessments are accomplished. The “experts” in that work center are unaware. The leadership is unaware because they rely on the experts. This type of problem, a complete absence of compliance, is generally due to a lack of training.

Another phenomenon that can mask non-compliance is the Customer Service Halo Effect. Take, for example, a high-performing computer shop. The customers are highly satisfied because the shop upgraded their computers in record time, nearly on demand. What appears to be a well-oiled front-end operation masks non-compliance in the back shop. Inspectors subsequently find that the computer shop is non-compliant in several information systems maintenance and quality assurance requirements and standards--areas transparent to the customer.

A less-used technique to find non-compliance is to study inspection or audit failures in similar organizations. It is very likely your programs will have a few of the same weaknesses. Although a highly effective technique, this is less commonly used because the reports of other organizations are not always available. The organization that produces this data should make it available to the enterprise and other like-organizations should actively seek this data.

Once organizations identify non-compliance areas, they should document with the root cause analysis and way ahead. Sometimes leaders accept non-compliance for valid reasons and they should not automatically label non-compliance as a risk. Sometimes risk is certainly involved, but, at other times, non-compliance improves unit performance by removing unnecessary constraints. Actively looking for non-compliance is an excellent start, but predicting it is even better. With proper capture of defects and trend analysis, organizations can develop predictions and even identify action triggers to stay ahead of non-compliance.

4. Prevent non-compliance. One might say that if organizations predicted non-compliance, then they should have prevented it, and the “find and predict” step above would have indeed led to a prevention discussion; however, in terms of compliance excellence, prevention is achieved by compliance assurance. Compliance assurance is the implementation of internal controls to build-in compliance, which intends to assure a compliant program or product. Organizations can then consider control and remediation taken after the detection of nonconformity. These concepts are similar to modern quality assurance and quality control methodologies. Compliance assurance describes controls, processes, or checklists implemented in compliance programs. These tools produce evidence and a history of deliberate compliance efforts, not someone’s one-time good idea. Excellence in this area occurs with the institutionalization of the tools across the enterprise.

5. Seek external validation. I highlighted the word “internal” earlier during the discussion of compliance black holes because sometimes self-assessment fails. Impartial experts outside the organization are highly effective in identifying shortcoming in programs. Look to sister organizations for assistance or develop Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) to solidify commitments to assistance. MOUs are valuable in scenarios where a host organization owns the overall program managers and MOUs are an excellent tool to ensure enduring support.

In summary, we can trace compliance excellence from deliberate and active management to proactive and concerned leaders. Compliance is more than a YES or NO state. It is a process and a culture!

Essential Elements of a Successful CCIP

What is the “Highly Effective” Commander’s Inspection Program (CCIP) formula? As an AFIA Oversight Inspector with 18-months experience validating wing-level CCIP programs, I hear this question occasionally during Unit Effectiveness Inspection (UEI) Capstone visits. I also get the same question as a guest Inspector General Training Course (IGTC) instructor. My response is typically, “Let’s start with “Effective,” and we’ll work our way there.” The entire answer is not simple, quick, nor short. Not because it is overly complicated but because it is a matter of culture and involvement. A highly effective CCIP is rooted in time, hard work, and a determination to be better than you were yesterday. The additional hurdle for some is that the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) is not a prescriptive collection of “wills, shalls, and musts.” AFIS is flexible and adaptable in meeting commander and mission requirements, and at the very center of AFIS is the CCIP.



I am going to outline four strengths common among units with a high performing CCIP: (1) CCIP Culture, (2) CCIP Policy, (3) Training, and (4) Commanders Inspection Management Board (CIMB).

CCIP Culture

- Commander’s intent sets the tone of CCIP culture and execution. If the commander does not buy into AFIS and a robust CCIP, the wing will follow suit.
- Readiness is indeed the priority, but readiness relies on detecting non-compliance to eliminate or mitigate limiting factors.
 - o Compliance paves the road to readiness.
 - o If we continue to let our compliance mindset atrophy, we will never achieve the levels of readiness for which we are aiming.
- Share success stories across the organization. We have just as much to learn from our successes as we do from our failures. Benchmark, implement, and share successful solutions, especially the ones that are base specific or mission unique across MAJCOMs.
- IGs need to be out asking how they can help. “Do you need training, guidance, or advice?” Think White Hat vs. Black Hat.
- Encourage IG staff to reach out to sister units and talk through shared challenges. Additionally, encourage squadrons/elements to seek assistance in building corrective action plans from the IG office instead of admiring their problems.

CCIP Policy

- Policy drives CCIP behaviors and reporting culture.
 - o Commanders should communicate CCIP policy that encourages transparency, embracing the red, learning from others, and standardizing successes.
 - o Encourage real-time reporting of issues so leadership can provide resources and attention at the right time and right place.
- Does local policy support the benefits of an effective CCIP? Does messaging of the policy encourage critical self-assessment and self-reporting or does it drive a culture of pencil whipping your Self-Assessment Communicators (SACs) to green up the MICT dashboard?
 - o Remember, MICT accomplishment does not equate to self-assessment, one must still actively manage their program.
- Develop IGEMS and MICT Business Rules that work with your wing’s battle rhythm.

SMSgt Christopher Lenzini, Oversight Directorate, Air Force Inspection Agency

- Set achievable time lines that allow IG staff to complete assessment periods with enough time to detect and correct errors.
- Review SACs in manageable portions throughout the year to eliminate the bow wave effect.
- Build an annual inspection plan that meets commander's intent and evolves to test and stress mission directives as they change.
- Develop full-spectrum exercises built to test capabilities and identify limitations against real-world OPLAN requirements.
 - What am I ready for? How do I know I am ready?
 - Have you looked at your Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to validate your unit's OPLAN taskings?
 - Do your exercises meet the S2R4 (Scope-Scale-Rigor, Relevance, Robustness and Reporting) standard expected by your Command chain?

Training

- Highly effective units have highly effective training programs.
 - Personnel turnover is high and training needs to flex to meet demands.
- Conduct recurring monthly MICT training open to all assessors, validators, and Self-Assessment Program Managers (SAPMs.)
 - Keep the training short to encourage max participation.
 - The goal is to create MICT gurus outside of the IG office.
 - Have work stations available to practice skills hands-on.
 - Cover different topics in each session and offer to stay behind to demonstrate other functions if needed.
 - Highly trained assessors and validators are more likely to open observations in real-time and share skills with peers and subordinates.
- Train Wing Inspection Team (WIT) members to a high level.
 - WIT members are a valuable resource to the IG office and CCIP.
 - Eliminate any perception that WIT is only suited for exercises.
 - Conduct thorough over-the-shoulder training to align IG needs with their functional expertise.

Effective Commander's Inspection Management Boards (CIMBs)

- CIMBs should be predictive in nature and not just a read back of undetected non-compliance.
- CIMBs are not staff meetings; save your agendas not related to CCIP for the next meeting.
- When I attend a CIMB meeting and a medium to large squadron has five or fewer open observations, I immediately plan to validate one of two possible outcomes: they're either that good, or they're pencil whipping their SACs and reluctant to report the red.
- Document and brief that the commander has accepted risk.
 - Brief active waivers and make sure personnel know where they are located.
- Invite Wing Process Managers to attend each CIMB.
 - Ideal opportunity to provide quarterly briefing to Commander IAW AFI 38-401, *Continuous Process Improvement*.
 - Opportunity to advise commanders on CPI tools, which can be used to enhance mission effectiveness and efficiency.

Remember: A highly effective CCIP is rooted in time, hard work, and a determination to be better than you were yesterday....Better, faster, smarter...ready.

Document the Improvement Path with MILEstones!!!

The Commander's Inspection Program (CCIP) encourages the demarcation of milestones as they relate to a unit's Self-Assessment Program (SAP). Interestingly, one can arrange the four major graded areas (MGA) of the CCIP to form the acronym MILE (Managing resources, Improving the unit, Leading people, and Executing the mission). When the acronym 'MILE' and the word 'stones' are combined, they form the word MILEstones. Viewed through the prism of the CCIP, MILEstones mark significant events, actions, and results occurring along a unit's journey towards improvement across the four MGAs. Let us take a look at specific SAP MILEstones and the importance of documenting them.



Unit Self-Assessment Program Projects: Unit SAP projects are the means by which a commander employs resources, self-assessment, and problem solving methods to identify and resolve or mitigate mission related challenges. It is important to highlight SAP projects as MILEstones for a few reasons. First, documenting these projects demonstrates a proactive approach to self-identifying non-compliance and mission observations that negatively affect the command. Second, documentation promotes team work and encourages innovation. Most importantly, do not track properly documented observations and concerns identified through the unit SAP as deficiencies within the Inspector General Evaluator Management System (IGEMS).

Self-Assessment Program Achievements & Roadblocks: SAP achievements are essentially victories, success stories, professional teams, and superior performers associated with a specific unit improvement project. SAP roadblocks are barriers to successful implementation of a corrective action plan, such as money, people, time, processes, and approval from higher authorities. It is important to document and share your MILEstone success stories and roadblocks for two reasons. First, sharing success provides solutions for other Air Force units to consider and delivers public recognition to innovative efforts. Second, communicating corrective action roadblocks is the first and most critical step in clearing the path on a stalled improvement plan. Units need to highlight barriers to senior leaders in order to receive help. Air Force Instruction 90-201, *The Air Force Inspection System*, directs commanders to highlight their top five Unit SAP observations as part of the monthly Wing Commander's Inspection Management Board (CIMB).

Corrective Action Plans: Corrective action plans are developed and implemented in order to mitigate mission-related challenges. Effective corrective action planning requires units to define their problem, identify root causes, develop courses of action, and define success for critical and significant deficiencies. The same documentation is required for units who self-identify non-compliance or mission gaps outside of the official IG inspection regime. Documenting unit corrective action MILEstones is the same as showing your work on a math test. Do not expect to receive credit unless you show your work! A functioning SAP documents improvement efforts, corrective action plans, achievements, and roadblocks clearly on a consistent basis. MILEstones confirm a functioning SAP exists and MILEstones help remove corrective action barriers. Ensure your unit marks its improvement path with MILEstones!

Professionalism in the Inspector General Corps

“We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit.”

– Aristotle

My name is Colonel Phill Layman, and I am the Chief, Inspection Division for Air Education and Training Command. My selection to this position triggered a reflection on what it means to be an Inspector General. These are my observations and not the stated policy of the AETC IG.



Foremost, be the eyes and ears of the Commander. As stated in AFI 90-201, *Air Force Inspection System*, “Inspection is an inherent function of command exercised at every level to evaluate the state of discipline, economy, efficiency, readiness, and resource management.” First, inspectors must accomplish their various inspections objectively and accurately, and tie deficiencies and observations back to the inspected unit’s mission effectiveness. We must plan, conduct, and report inspections to assess the unit with minimum impact on the unit’s mission and Airmen’s time. Ultimately, the inspection team is there to provide an independent measurement of mission effectiveness and readiness to the Commander and their staff. While inspectors are not trainers, there are times it IS appropriate for the inspection team to suggest possible solutions relevant to the unit’s mission, often based on observed success elsewhere. Inspection teams need to hold people accountable; The Air Force Inspection System seeks undiscovered non-compliance that exposes the unit to unassessed risks that may jeopardize the mission. This is a balancing act. The Air Force Chief of Staff charged squadron commanders to take calculated risks in order to achieve their mission, but this does not equate to willful disobedience of established standards, especially in areas of U.S. law, safety, and human relations.

Epitomize the Image of the Inspector General. We all need to remember we represent our Commanders while conducting inspections. If we fall short in our duties, it not only reflects poorly on us but also erodes the trust our Commanders have in us. You may have heard the story of an inspector who forgot their uniforms and tried to hide their actions by borrowing another person’s ABU. Be prepared and have a plan.

It is a challenge to keep up on physical fitness while on the road conducting inspections but take time to keep yourself healthy and fit. I look for opportunities to go jogging on new (to me) exercise trails and use the inspected unit’s fitness facilities. Leadership selects us for IG duty because of our expertise, good judgement, and communication ability. Do not allow those to atrophy during your inspector time: continue to develop your job skills, educate yourself on your Commander’s priorities, ongoing mission changes, base construction, innovation, and Total Force initiatives. Develop a recurring time and place to stay up on the rapid pace of change in today’s Air Force. Also, know what you do not know--it is rarely a good idea to “shoot from the hip” when it comes to technical and legal standards; take the time to check the applicable guidance.

Support your Wingman (and get their support). We all need someone we can trust to bounce new ideas off, to proofread written reports and communications, and provide critical feedback when needed. Two pairs of eyes see more than one, two heads think more critically than one. It is helpful to have an IG Wingman who understands the pressures and frustrations of inspections duty when we need to vent.

Colonel Phillip Layman, Chief, Inspection Division, HQ AETC/IG

Lead professionally. One of my best commanders, Major General Garrett Harencak, always challenged his Airmen to “Be the boss you always wished you had.” Somewhere in the Air Force is a young Airman who will replace each and every one of us. We owe it to them to share our experience and provide opportunities and challenges to help them develop. This is especially true for inspectors who may not have supervised a whole flight or squadron but arguably have the opportunity to influence others as they inspect across their wing or command.

On the end of the continuum, I sometimes think of the worst supervisor I ever had, if only to provide an example of actions to avoid. He undermined our unit’s culture of success by insisting all communication flowed through him, played favorites among the junior officers, and reinforced micromanagement and toxic leadership tendencies. We all have negative experiences, but it is up to us to make a positive lesson out of them. There is an old proverb, “A wise person learns from their mistakes, someone wiser learns from the mistakes of others.”

Finally, our ultimate goal as Inspectors is to make the Wing, Base, and Air Force better than we found it. Oftentimes that fosters a “checklist mentality” that while not wrong, might limit the speed of improvements. As inspectors, we need to ensure we understand and contribute to the pace of innovation expressed by the Commanders we support. This is the 21st Century, and we are living in the “Future.” We should move with the applicable speed.



Tech. Sgt. Joe Parker refuels an F-35A Lightning II May 16, 2013, from the 58th Fighter Squadron at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. The 33rd Fighter Wing is a joint graduate flying and maintenance training wing that trains Air Force, Marine, Navy, and international partner operators and maintainers of the F-35. Parker is a KC-135 Stratotanker boom operator from the 336th Air Refueling Squadron at March Air Reserve Base, Calif. (U.S. Air Force photo/Master Sgt. John R. Nimmo Sr.)

May THE FORCE Be with You!

Implore you I will...the dark side strong it is...hard the way of the good Investigating Officer (IO) certain to be...use the FORCE you must! I hope you will forgive my Yoda rip of an introduction, but I could not resist. The topic du jour is an old one but bears revisiting--report writing and the IG investigation, particularly reprisal investigations.



As an institution, we continue to struggle when it comes to producing timely quality products for a wide variety of reasons. Before I get to report writing, let me highlight a few collateral areas of concern. First, make the decision to investigate as early as possible. For the same reason, make sure you do a thorough analysis on the front end so that you do not investigate an issue, which can be resolved via an alternate means. The key, I believe, is the quality and quantity of GOOD evidence you have on hand initially...if you have a lot, you may be able to avoid an investigation. If you do not, an investigation may be the best way to get what you need.

When you make the decision to investigate, do not procrastinate. Find a good IO who will be available full time for the duration, and get your commander's support. The sooner the investigation is complete, the sooner your IO can get his or her life back. The easiest way to get the investigation done is to have the IO work full time on only the investigation. Do your part! Train the IO and make sure the focus stays on the issues he or she will investigate. I cannot overemphasize the need for the IO and IGQ staff to be partners in the investigative effort. It is the IO's investigation, but you must be the administrative support and subject matter expert call center.

Despite my nearly 15 years of trying to eradicate some common errors in our reports, they persist (there goes my next annual appraisal). In an effort to salvage my reputation and ensure a much-needed time-off award, I want to urge you to use the "FORCE" when writing your reports: *F-Facts, O-Organize, R-Resolve, C-Compare, E-Explain*.

Facts. First, get some. More importantly, get the right ones to address the issues under investigation. This is critical. I will use reprisal as an example. You must get the facts (generally from testimony) to answer the four main questions of the elements of reprisal and the four sub questions of element four. This is non-negotiable. If you do not get them, you will have a very tough time writing your report and making your case. So, how do you get the right facts? You get the right evidence, and, to get the right evidence, you must ask the right questions. Focused evidence collection is vital to a successful investigation.

For instance, I just finished reviewing an investigation with 32 multi-megabyte files of transcribed witness testimony. There was lots of history, vivid descriptions of relationships, rationale on why people hate each other, and the genesis of office cliques and tribal warfare. However, there was precious little in the way of answers to direct questions about the elements of reprisal and those, sadly, were buried in the morass of information and difficult to find. I cannot lay the blame for this shortcoming on the IO when it is really on the shoulders of the supervising IG. Be an active participant in question development. Review the testimony for evidence gaps and get it corrected. If you need an idea of what questions to ask in a reprisal investigation, open up the DoD Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations (WRI) Guide to Investigating Military Whistleblower Reprisal and Restriction Complaints. Pay particular attention to Chapter 3 and the questions therein.

Organize. Most IOs collect more evidence and facts than they need. Organize your information and isolate the message from the noise. Those facts and evidence are the ones that need to be included

Mr. Ronald Hatfield, Chief, Complaints Resolution, HQ AETC/IGQ

in your report. Include other facts to set the stage or explain relevant, related issues, but avoid the temptation to use everything you gathered. Once you have the relevant facts, put them in chronological order and tell the whole story in Section II, Tab B. When you get to writing Section II, Tab C, and addressing individual allegations, organize the facts so you use only the facts that support the allegation you are addressing.

Resolve. The IO must resolve conflicting evidence when trying to establish fact. If two witnesses give different evidence patterns regarding an event, the IO must decide which version is fact. To do this, get more evidence to tip the scale one way or another. Weight of evidence is not the sole determining factor especially when it comes to the handling of hearsay. Regardless of the methodology, the IO must resolve conflicting evidence and should provide rationale for believing one version over the other. Make sure you apply the preponderance of evidence standard and do not creep towards clear and convincing or beyond a reasonable doubt. Leave bias out of the equation; command is not always right, and the complainant is not always a victim.

Compare. You must compare the facts, once established, with the elements of the standard in the allegation. This starts with knowing what standard is appropriate. For most of our investigations, the standard will be 10 U.S.C. §1034. The elements of the standard are the conditions that for the standard to be violated. For reprisal, the elements are as follows:

Element 1, Protected Communication (PC): Did complainant make or prepare to make a protected communication, or did responsible management officials (RMO) perceive that the complainant made or prepared to make a protected communication?

Element 2, Personnel Action (PA): Did RMOs take an unfavorable personnel action or threatened to take action against complainant, or did officials withhold or threaten to withhold a favorable personnel action from complainant?

Element 3, Knowledge: Did RMOs know that complainant made or prepared to make protected communication(s) or perceive complainant as having made or prepared to make protected communication(s)?

Element 4, Causation: Would RMOs take, withhold, or threaten the same personnel action(s) against the complainant absent the protected communication(s)? What is the reason stated by the RMO for taking, withholding, or threatening action? What is the timing between the PC and PA? What is the motive on the part of the RMO for deciding, taking, or withholding the PA? Did the complainant suffer disparate treatment as compared to other similarly situation individuals that did not make PCs?

If you remember, the IO theoretically gathered facts with the goal of being able to address each of these elements and questions using those facts. Thus, the IO must compare the facts gathered to answer each question of the elements of reprisal and decide if the element is satisfied or not. If facts show there was a PC, the first element is satisfied. If the facts show there was a PA, that element is satisfied. If the facts show the RMO knew of the PC, that element is satisfied. If any of these first three elements are not satisfied, you cannot have reprisal and need not move on to the questions in element four. However, if the elements are satisfied, you must move to element four and use the fact pattern to establish whether there was a causal link between the PC and the PA. Having a good fact pattern is the key here; if you do not have it, will be tough sledding. The last step revolves around element four.

Explain. The IO must provide the connective tissue that makes the argument an effective muscle group that can carry the message. Analysis or explanation in most IG investigation centers on reprisal element four and that element has four areas of interest or sub-questions.

Establishing RMO reasons is straightforward provided you ask the right questions during your interviews. Many times, you can glean RMO reasons from documents. RMO reasons are often simply a matter of establishing fact. However, while DoD guidance does not advocate this, it is often helpful to EXPLAIN or analyze the reasonableness of the RMO reasons in an attempt to establish the legitimacy of the PA. The IO can do this by getting a JA opinion about validity of the personnel action, by comparing the reasons for compliance with policy if it exists and by looking at the treatment of others under similar circumstances. Similar to RMO reasons, the question of disparate treatment may not require a great deal of explanation depending on the facts.

To evaluate disparate treatment, the IO must gather facts to establish how the subject responded in the past when confronted with similarly-situated personnel who did not make PCs. If the subject has never dealt with a similar situation, one cannot make an evaluation of disparate treatment and the IO should say so. However, if the subject has dealt with similar situations in the past, the IO must establish how the subject reacted in those situations and EXPLAIN how it corresponds to or differs from his or her reactions in the current situation. Often, the facts themselves will make a case, but the IO needs an explanation to address the disparate treatment question. Unlike with RMO reasons and disparate treatment, the EXPLAIN piece is usually critical to the questions dealing with RMO motive and timing between the PC and PA. These areas require not only a good fact pattern but a cohesive explanation as well.

For instance, what facts can the IO use to evaluate timing? The IO will also need to know when the PC and PA occurred. However, the IO must put this into perspective through explanation. Does the significant delay between the PC and the PA mean the PC did not upset the RMO or is it due to the RMO having to wait until the Standard Cutoff Date for the complainant Enlisted Performance Report before he or she could retaliate? Conversely, was the two-day delay between the PC and the PA due to an emotional response by the RMO, or was it coincidence that the RMO initiated the PA prior to the PC? For the question of timing, context is everything.

Subjects or suspects who have reprised will seldom share their motive during testimony. Those who have not reprised may not address their motive unless you ask. Establishing motive can be very difficult and, unless you have a credible statement from the subject or suspect in response to a direct motive question, invariably an explanation is required. Provided he or she asks the right questions, the IO will have some facts gathered from testimony, either that of the subject or of witnesses who have firsthand knowledge of the subject's emotional landscape as sculpted by the PCS. However, it is critical the IO explain how those facts establish the visceral impetus, or what IG DoD WRI calls animus, behind the subject's actions. In most reprisal investigations, motive is the one single fact that tips the scale of guilt in one direction or the other. Remember that the standard is preponderance of evidence. Avoid using a higher standard.

Lastly, "Explain" also pertains to documenting unusual occurrences during the investigation. I recommend doing this in Section II, Tab B, in an Errata section. For instance, if the IO interviews witnesses out of order, explain why. If the IO does not interview certain witnesses, explain why. If the IO adds or withdraws allegations, explain why. You get the idea. Many folks will read your tome...most will not read your Automated Case Tracking System (ACTS) case notes. Answer questions about why things happen before they get to be questions.

Okay, there you have it. Nothing new I am sure, but based on casual observation, still pertinent. The need for the IG system to be relevant in the narrow area of reprisal investigations mandates we do a better job regarding both timeliness and quality; the two are inextricably linked. Use the FORCE...help you it will.

What's Your Waiver Process?

Some describe the waiver process as a shadow-filled abyss upon which no warrior truly needs to embark. Therefore, the question becomes, “Do we really need a waiver process?” Can we just acknowledge we cannot or do not need to follow a requirement in our guidance and move on? “What’s your waiver process?”

We know the Air Force has defined an overarching waiver process in AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, and commanders clearly have the authority and responsibility to identify and assume risk where needed. However, how do we leverage this process at the wing-level and gain synergy across our organizations?



The point I wish to drive home is the need to understand the importance of documenting decisions to leave deficiencies open or to grant waivers and to share this information across organizations. Program/process owners, supervisors, commanders, and IGs must engage in a viable waiver process with situational awareness by the Wing Commander. An understanding and acceptance of the “why” behind the waiver is critical to our units’ readiness.

Our journey starts with the guidance. We must first identify those tasks we must do but did not know existed. This is how we find the blind spots and are areas of potential undetected noncompliance. How many of us or our Wing Inspection Team (WIT) members have asked unit members questions about their self-assessment programs and governing directives and were told, “That isn’t in the continuity book I got from my predecessor,” “That isn’t in my self-assessment communicator (SAC),” or “I only complete my SACs, that’s all I’m required to do, isn’t it?”

We love to take advantage of these training opportunities and articulate the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) basics of “We must all adhere to the guidance to know our job, do our job, and be able to tell our boss when we can no longer do our job.” These familiar words are also the cornerstone of our waiver process.

Continuing down the winding road of the waiver-process, we must next identify those things we must stop doing because they do not make sense and the need for the proper authority to remove the guidance telling us to do it. This is slightly different, but goes hand-in-hand with ascertaining which tasks or responsibilities do not apply to our organization. The former could be antiquated, non-value-added, or just plain trivial requirements that are unnecessary due to technological advances, system upgrades, mission changes, etc. While these do not require a waiver, we do need to contact the guidance office of primary responsibility (OPR) and let them know. The best way to do this is by completing an AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*. We have smart people in our Air Force, and, if enough of them complain about guidance that is unnecessary or trivial, OPRs will likely rescind the guidance.

What if the guidance is pertinent to the mission, but we cannot follow because of limited or non-existent resources? This is trickier because it requires us to prioritize our resources to meet our mission readiness needs and match our commander’s intent. This is where we identify and accept risk and initiate our waiver process. We know commanders are identifying risk, yet we do not see their organizations processing waivers; so, how do we leverage the knowledge from our guidance?

The first step is to flowchart the waiver process. Use continuous process improvement (CPI) principles to address process pitfalls and potential areas of improvement to build a wing process. We flowcharted the new process to show how it leverages subject-matter experts (SMEs), eliminates

duplicate efforts, addresses similar issues across comparable organizations, and spurs discussions on the reasons behind waiver decisions.

Five Points in Building a Waiver Process:

1. Submitting Waivers. If a unit is submitting a waiver, the unit should already have a self-identified deficiency. It is all about transparency. We want our units to document when and why they have stopped doing a requirement, while providing wing and/or higher-level leadership situational awareness. Our wing business rules require units open the deficiency in the Management Internal Control Toolset (MICT) under the associated HAF/MAJCOM SAC or within a Local Deficiency Tracker.

2. Identify Process Owners. Units must identify process owners/SMEs and bring them into the discussion at the front-end of the waiver process. We feel it is imperative that process owners have a voice in the decision-making process when a unit wants to waive a process they do not own (i.e., a training squadron wanting to waive a records management requirement).

3. Buck Stop. Push the decisions down to the lowest approval level allowed, but keep your wing leadership situationally aware. We do this with open discussions on newly approved or submitted waivers at our monthly Commanders Inspection Management Board (CIMB).

4. Avoid Duplication of Effort. Identify those potential deficiencies that have impact across multiple units early in the process to eliminate potential duplication of effort.

5. IG involvement is critical. We determined early on that having the IG track all wing-approved waivers, as well as waivers the wing is submitting to higher headquarters, was crucial to the success of the waiver process, not just at the wing, but in the Air Force’s waiver process as well.


Many units already have a process in place and discuss their waivers at their CIMBs, so by no means is this a new thought process. Our wing just took it a step further by flowcharting the process, documenting a walk-through of the process to ease its implementation, and ensuring an understanding by all participants. Communication, guidance, and commander’s intent are key to building the process that works for your unit. And with that, you can answer the question: “What is your waiver process?”



TSgt. Kevin Seney, 335th Training Squadron instructor, participates in a flag folding ceremony during a POW/MIA Retreat ceremony at Keesler Air Force Base, Miss. (U.S. Air Force photo by Kemberly Groue)

Current Analysis Efforts at AFIA

The Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA) is ideally positioned to observe compliance across all corners of the Air Force. Inspection and evaluation data--in the form of web-based databases, final report narratives, and spreadsheets-- illuminate all of the service's functional areas. Inspection data are rich in breadth and depth but require focused analytical effort to unlock the insights hidden within to provide descriptive, diagnostic, predictive, and prescriptive analysis, which aid Air Force leaders in making informed decisions.



Within AFIA's Enterprise Support (ET) Directorate is the Analysis Division (ETA). The ET Analysis Division consists of active duty and civilian analysts working to provide high quality, decision-level information to service leadership. Our analysts have technical backgrounds in operations research, mathematics, and statistics, and operational experience in a variety of military functional areas. We constantly review our data strategy to meet AFIA's strategic priorities and objectives, and better understand data lifecycles.

Understanding data lifecycles cuts down on "gratuitous analysis," science projects that might be interesting but do not answer leadership's "so what?" litmus test. To address this issue, we borrowed an idea from the test and evaluation community and drafted a data management and analysis plan (DMAP). The DMAP describes AFIA data sources; how data are gathered; what they inform; how they are used; what mathematical tools/techniques apply and which requirements the data supports. Its purpose is to clearly link data tactics, techniques, and procedures to data requirements.

The DMAP is helping to focus our efforts to expand analytic capacity and improve the depth of analysis we provide. We have recently added additional experienced analysts, developed various MS Excel tools, and acquired IBM SPSS Modeler, and SAS JMP ("Jump") Basic. One of the appeals of IBM SPSS is its text analytics feature. Free text, in the form of survey comments or deficiency narratives is full of information, but it is difficult to extract meaningful results. Reading and interpreting hundreds of text entries from survey responses or inspection entries to extract the underlying sentiment behind them is challenging. We believe text analysis will provide not only insight into attitudes and intent but also will help improve binning techniques and inspection planning during risk based sampling strategy (RBSS) steps. However, we are not there yet, in the meantime, we provide several MS Excel tools on the IG Evaluation Management System (IGEMS) SharePoint site which IGs, and even unit commanders may find useful.

The MS Excel tools we provide on SharePoint have tailored reports pulled monthly by the IGEMS database manager. Users may download the tool(s) and perform their own analysis. However, these tools are strictly descriptive in nature—they show us *what* has already happened, but they do not offer projections, forecasts, future trends, or options for what to do next. Consider them the minimal solution for production-level queries: quarterly metrics and charts for the number and type of inspections, deficiencies, etc., by MAJCOM, major graded area, function, etc. Of note, only IGEMS has this capability but IG Evaluation Management System-Classified (IGEMS-C) does not. Since IGEMS-C data will become increasingly important as we expand our readiness reporting throughout the enterprise, we are taking steps to obtain that data as well. Our aim is to provide comprehensive, intuitive tools to IG offices and commanders with commonly requested fields on data derived from both IGEMS and IGEMS-C. But that is not our only goal.

AFIA's top analysis priority is to determine leading indicators of risk. To accomplish this daunting task, we must move analysis past the descriptive stage and into diagnostic, predictive and prescriptive analytics. We want to move beyond just making predictions of a unit's inspection rating, or

telling commanders where they have problems—an effective Commander’s Inspection Program [CCIP] already does that. What we are really after are the “Ah-ha!” nuggets that let senior leaders and other decision makers get in front of issues *before* they become problems.

As an outgrowth of that effort, we have an ongoing initiative to bring contemporary data analytics to AFIS. We are combining the latest software tools with data mining, data cleaning, text analysis techniques, and training to create higher order solutions: diagnostic (why something likely happened), predictive (when something is likely to happen), and prescriptive (what to do to gain the best outcome).

Diagnostic analyses determine relationships through the strength of their correlations. The value of diagnostic analyses is the ability to state, with a level of confidence, that when certain combinations of conditions are present, a particular state or condition tends to be the result. Causality is generally not the goal, as it requires rigorous statistical hypothesis testing.

Predictive analyses builds upon what we learn from diagnostic discoveries. In order to make forecasts, we must be able to conceptualize and reason about future states based upon assumptions from well-understood prior observations. Successful implementation of predictive analyses provides an intelligent “guesstimate” of what will happen next. The value of accurate predictive analyses is quite high; it is the instrument that removes surprise and reaction from a decision making process. However, while we might have an idea of what the future looks like, we are not trying to change it—we are only describing it.

As our knowledge of a process increases and our confidence in our predictions grow, we can move to the prescriptive stage. At this level, we have sufficient understanding of a process and a record of accuracy in our prediction models. What sets prescriptive analyses apart from the other analysis stages is that we consider the influence of external factors on a process, and use prior knowledge to develop courses of action that are likely to lead to *desired* future states. The objective is to present the decision maker with “Here is what you can do” options. Resource limitations coupled with operational constraints limit the realm of what is most desirable to the realm of what is actually do-able. Prescriptive options presented to the decision maker should discretely identify resource shortfalls, mission risk, and likelihood of success in achieving the desired effect.

It is an exciting time to be in AFIA. In consideration of the Secretary and Chief’s priorities, particularly readiness, analysis adds a lot of value. Putting the pieces together--achieving a better understanding of what is on Airmen’s minds and gleaning leading indicators of risk--are launching us quickly into a new dimension in decision making.



SSgt Jeff Tuscany, a combat arms instructor with the 81st SFS at Keesler AFB, MS, fires his weapon. (USAF Photo)

IG Class Dates

MAJCOM/Wing IGTC Class Dates

*The location for courses, unless location noted otherwise, is 9700 G Ave SE, Bldg. 24499, Room 357, Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5670. Check IG World classroom (<https://cs2.eis.af.mil/sites/12634/igc/default.aspx>) for the most current schedule; classes are subject to change.

9-11 Oct--IGTC MAJCOM
16-18 Oct--IGTC Wing
6-8 Nov--IGTC MAJCOM
13-15 Nov--IGTC Wing
27-29 Nov--IGTC Wing
4-6 Dec--IGTC Wing
11-13 Dec--IGTC MAJCOM

NSI Class Date

12 Oct 18
14 Nov 18 – Scott AFB


FY18 IGQ IGTC Class Dates

*The location for all IGQ courses is the National Conference Center in Lansdowne, VA.

IGTC 19A: 22-26 Oct 18
IGTC 19B: 28 Jan-1 Feb 19
IGTC 19C: 18-22 Mar 19
IGTC 19D: 17-21 Jun 19
IGTC 19E: 22-26 Jul 19
IGTC 19F: 19-23 Aug 19

Please review the [IGTC Student Handbook](#) (updated 9 Jul) for helpful information on attending the course.

RESERVE YOUR SLOTS NOW THROUGH YOUR MAJCOM POC!! (Exception: ANG Wing IGs must sign up through ANG/IG, Mr. Darrell Randolph).



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